ALMS: Skin Drug Trials Show Major Promise—Don’t Miss Out!

Company Overview and Pipeline

Alumis Inc. (NASDAQ: ALMS) is a late-stage clinical biopharmaceutical company focused on immune-mediated diseases. The company leverages a precision data analytics platform to develop next-generation targeted therapies, particularly oral Tyrosine Kinase 2 (TYK2) inhibitors (^[1]). Alumis’ lead drug candidate is envudeucitinib (formerly ESK-001), a highly selective oral TYK2 inhibitor designed to correct immune dysregulation in diseases driven by IL-23, IL-17, and type I interferon pathways (^[1]). Envudeucitinib has been advancing in multiple indications:

– Plaque Psoriasis (moderate-to-severe) – Two pivotal Phase 3 trials (ONWARD-1 and ONWARD-2) have just delivered positive topline results. Both trials met all primary and secondary endpoints with high statistical significance (^[2]). Notably, ~65% of patients achieved PASI 90 (90% skin clearance) and over 40% achieved PASI 100 (100% clear skin) by week 24 (^[2]) (^[2]) – efficacy levels approaching those of injectable biologics. A leading dermatology expert noted that historically biologic drugs offered superior skin clearance, “but now, with these new data on envudeucitinib, we’re seeing an exciting possibility of a new oral drug for psoriasis that can deliver high levels of efficacy in a safe manner” (^[2]). Envudeucitinib’s safety profile in Phase 3 was favorable and consistent with earlier trials (common side effects were mild, e.g. headache or nasopharyngitis) and no new safety signals emerged (^[2]). Alumis plans to file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA in the second half of 2026 (^[2]), aiming to bring this oral therapy to market as a potential best-in-class psoriasis treatment.

– Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE) – Envudeucitinib is also being tested in SLE patients. The Phase 2b LUMUS trial in lupus has completed enrollment (^[3]). Topline data from LUMUS are expected in the third quarter of 2026 (^[2]). Positive results in lupus could position envudeucitinib as a pipeline-in-a-pill, extending its use beyond psoriasis into another major autoimmune disease (^[2]). This differentiation – tackling both IL-23/IL-17–driven diseases like psoriasis and type I interferon–driven diseases like lupus – underscores the drug’s broad potential (^[2]).

– A-005 (CNS-Penetrant TYK2 Inhibitor) – Alumis’ second program is A-005, a first-in-class CNS-penetrant allosteric TYK2 inhibitor for neuroinflammatory and neurodegenerative disorders (^[1]). Because A-005 can cross the blood-brain barrier, it could address diseases like multiple sclerosis (MS) and Parkinson’s. A Phase 1 trial in healthy volunteers was completed in 2024 (^[4]). Alumis is on track to initiate a Phase 2 trial in multiple sclerosis in the first half of 2026 (^[3]). This program broadens Alumis’ pipeline into central nervous system diseases, offering another high-value catalyst if efficacy is demonstrated.

– Lonigutamab (IGF-1R inhibitor) – Through a mid-2025 merger (details below), Alumis also added lonigutamab to its pipeline. Lonigutamab is a subcutaneous monoclonal antibody targeting the IGF-1 receptor, in development for Thyroid Eye Disease (TED) (^[5]). ACELYRIN, the company Alumis merged with, had reported positive Phase 1/2 proof-of-concept data for lonigutamab in TED, showing significant clinical improvements (^[6]) (^[7]). By early 2025, a Phase 3 program design was announced (^[8]), indicating that lonigutamab is moving toward late-stage trials. This asset, if successful, could compete in the multi-billion dollar TED market (currently served by treatments like Tepezza) and further diversify Alumis’ late-stage portfolio (^[9]).

In addition to these core programs, Alumis (post-merger) has several preclinical projects identified via its precision analytics approach (^[5]). These early programs could yield future pipeline candidates targeting other immune-mediated conditions, though details remain under wraps. Overall, the combined pipeline is robust and diversified across dermatology, rheumatology, neurology, and ophthalmology, giving Alumis multiple “shots on goal” in large markets (^[9]).

Recent Trial Results: Major Promise in Psoriasis

Alumis’ recent Phase 3 success in psoriasis is a game-changer for the company. Both ONWARD trials for envudeucitinib achieved superior skin clearance versus placebo on co-primary endpoints (PASI 75 and sPGA 0/1) at 16 weeks, with highly significant p-values (<0.0001) (^[2]). Efficacy deepened by 24 weeks, with the majority of patients reaching near-complete clearance (PASI 90 or 100) (^[2]) (^[2]). For context, such high response rates are unprecedented for oral psoriasis therapies – traditionally only injected biologics (like IL-17 or IL-23 inhibitors) achieved PASI90/100 in >50% of patients. Envudeucitinib’s ability to rival biologic-like efficacy in an oral pill form is generating excitement in the dermatology field (^[2]).

Safety-wise, envudeucitinib appears well-tolerated: no serious safety flags emerged in Phase 3, and common adverse events were mostly mild and manageable (e.g. headache, respiratory infections, mild acne) (^[2]). This is important given some first-generation TYK2 inhibitors had dose-limiting side effects like rash at higher exposures (^[10]) (^[4]). Alumis has emphasized that envudeucitinib, as a second-generation TYK2 inhibitor, was designed for maximal target inhibition without those tolerability issues (^[4]). The Phase 3 data seem to validate that design – no new safety signals were seen even at efficacious doses (^[2]).

Investors have taken notice: ALMS stock surged after the topline results announcement, reflecting optimism that envudeucitinib could be a best-in-class oral therapy for psoriasis. The company is now preparing for regulatory filings and commercialization strategy. An NDA submission is planned for H2 2026 (^[2]), which, if approved on standard timelines, could position envudeucitinib for a potential 2027 U.S. launch. Alumis will also present detailed Phase 3 results at an upcoming medical conference (^[2]) – these data will be closely watched to compare envudeucitinib head-to-head against BMS’s Sotyktu (deucravacitinib), the currently approved TYK2 inhibitor. Notably, Sotyktu was the first oral TYK2 drug (FDA-approved in 2022), but its efficacy plateaued below biologics’ levels (^[10]). Alumis’ drug has now raised the bar, delivering what the company touts as “leading skin clearance among next-generation oral therapies” (^[11]) (^[2]). If these results translate into real-world use, envudeucitinib could capture significant share in the multi-billion dollar psoriasis market.

Beyond psoriasis, success in Phase 3 bodes well for envudeucitinib’s lupus program (data in 2026) and potentially other IL-23/IL-17-driven conditions (the drug was also studied in non-infectious uveitis per earlier plans (^[10])). In short, Alumis’ clinical data to date strongly de-risks its lead asset and highlight a platform that might yield multiple indications – this is a key reason not to overlook ALMS at this stage.

Dividend Policy and Shareholder Returns

Alumis is a development-stage biotech and, like most peers, it does not pay any dividend. The company has never declared or paid cash dividends on its stock and explicitly does not anticipate paying dividends in the foreseeable future, preferring to reinvest in R&D and pipeline growth (^[12]) (^[12]). As a result, dividend yield is 0%, and investors should expect that any returns will come from stock price appreciation if the company’s drug development efforts succeed (^[12]).

Traditional income-oriented metrics such as Funds From Operations (FFO) or Adjusted FFO (AFFO) are not applicable here – those are measures for REITs or cash-generative businesses. Alumis has no established revenue (it reported zero product or license revenue as of mid-2025) and incurs net losses as it funds clinical trials (^[3]) (^[3]). Thus, there are no earnings or cash flows to distribute. The policy is to retain all capital to advance the pipeline, which is common for biotechs at this stage (^[12]). In sum, investors in ALMS should be seeking long-term capital gains, not income. The only direct shareholder return in recent history was via value creation events – for example, the stock price jumped in response to clinical breakthroughs, rewarding shareholders with capital gains (at least on paper). But until drug approval and commercialization, do not expect any dividend payouts or buybacks.

Financial Position, Leverage, and Cash Runway

Balance Sheet Strength: Alumis currently boasts a strong balance sheet, thanks to large capital raises and a strategic merger. The company completed its IPO in mid-2024, raising roughly $250 million (slightly below initial targets) (^[4]), on top of a $259 million Series C financing earlier that year (^[10]). In May 2025, Alumis merged with ACELYRIN, Inc. in an all-stock deal that significantly bolstered its cash reserves. ACELYRIN had been a well-capitalized immunology biotech (with ~$448 million in cash at end of 2024) (^[9]). The combined company had a pro forma cash and marketable securities balance of about $737 million as of Dec 31, 2024 (^[9]). By mid-2025, after integration and ongoing R&D spend, Alumis still held $486.3 million in cash, equivalents and marketable securities (^[3]). Management expects this war chest to fund operations into 2027 (^[3]), providing a comfortable runway through major upcoming milestones (e.g. Phase 2 lupus data and NDA filing).

Debt and Leverage: Notably, Alumis carries minimal debt on its balance sheet. The company has financed its growth primarily through equity (venture rounds, IPO proceeds, and stock issued in the ACELYRIN merger), rather than borrowing. As of the latest reports, there are no significant loans or convertible notes outstanding – liabilities consist mostly of accounts payable, lease obligations, and other working capital items (^[12]) (^[12]). Alumis’ lease commitments (for offices/labs) are modest relative to its cash (e.g. ~$31.6M total lease liabilities as of mid-2024) (^[12]). With effectively zero long-term financial debt, the company’s leverage ratio is negligible. This clean capital structure means no interest burden – in fact, Alumis earns interest income on its large cash balance (it earned ~$2.0 million in interest in Q2 2024) (^[12]). Consequently, metrics like interest coverage are a non-issue (there are no interest expenses to cover). The absence of debt gives Alumis financial flexibility and lowers the risk of financial distress; it won’t face debt maturities or covenants while it remains pre-revenue.

Cash Burn and Coverage: As a clinical-stage biotech, Alumis does have a high “burn rate” – it spends heavily on R&D and operations. For the quarter ending June 30, 2025, operating expenses were over $140 million (including one-time merger costs), with R&D expenses alone at $108.8 million for that quarter (^[13]). This reflects multiple late-stage trials running in parallel. Such spending translates to significant quarterly losses (though a one-time accounting gain made Q2 2025 GAAP net-income positive (^[13]), the core operating result was a large loss). The company will continue incurring losses in the near term, consuming cash to fund trials and regulatory preparations. However, with nearly half a billion dollars in the bank post-merger, cash coverage for operations is strong – Alumis has indicated it has sufficient capital to reach 2027 without needing new financing (^[3]). This timeline should comfortably cover the Phase 3 psoriasis program completion, NDA filing, the lupus Phase 2 readout, and possibly preparation for a Phase 3 in lupus or launch efforts. Investors should monitor the cash burn rate relative to the clinical timeline: if development accelerates or unexpected costs arise, additional capital might be required before 2027. But as of now, dilution risk is moderate; the company’s current cash is expected to cover its planned activities for the next ~2 years. Importantly, Alumis’ strong balance sheet – with no debt and substantial cash – was a deliberate outcome of the ACELYRIN merger, positioning it to advance its pipeline without the overhang of near-term financing needs (^[5]).

Valuation and Market Potential

Valuing a pre-revenue biotech like Alumis involves assessing its pipeline’s potential against its market capitalization. Traditional valuation metrics (P/E, EV/EBITDA, etc.) are not meaningful here given negative earnings and lack of revenue. Instead, investors look at pipeline net present value (NPV), comparable transactions, and cash adjusted value. A few key points on ALMS’s valuation:

– Cash-Adjusted Valuation: Alumis had roughly $486 million in cash mid-2025 (^[3]). Even after recent spending, cash likely remains a significant portion of the company’s market cap. In fact, prior to the Phase 3 results, management felt the stock was undervalued – pointing out a “current dislocation” in valuation (^[9]). They implied the market cap didn’t fully reflect the ~$737M pro forma cash and the advanced pipeline. A cash-rich balance sheet provides a floor to valuation; it reduces effective enterprise value (EV = Market Cap – Cash). If ALMS shares were trading near or even below net cash at times, that suggested investors were assigning very low value to the pipeline (perhaps due to risk perception). The recent data may correct this dislocation by convincing the market that envudeucitinib (and other assets) are indeed quite valuable. As a result of the positive Phase 3 news, ALMS’s stock price jumped (reportedly ~60% in a day) as investors started pricing in higher odds of future revenue and approval. Even after this rally, one could argue the enterprise value remains modest relative to peers, considering the potential payoff if envudeucitinib becomes a commercial success.

– Comparable Deals & Comps: The psoriasis market opportunity is large – moderate-to-severe psoriasis affects millions of patients globally. Bristol Myers Squibb’s Sotyktu (deucravacitinib), the currently marketed TYK2 inhibitor, is projected to be a blockbuster drug with multi-billion dollar annual sales potential, though its efficacy leaves room for improvement (^[2]) (^[4]). Notably, big-pharma interest in next-gen TYK2 drugs has been intense: In late 2022, Takeda agreed to acquire Nimbus Therapeutics’ TYK2 inhibitor (now called TAK-279) for $4 billion upfront after promising Phase 2 results (^[10]). Takeda’s asset is viewed as a potential challenger to Sotyktu, similar to Alumis’ envudeucitinib. However, envudeucitinib is trailing slightly timewise – Takeda’s TAK-279 began Phase 3 in 2023 (^[4]). Still, Alumis contends its molecule has best-in-class properties (more complete TYK2 inhibition without safety trade-offs) (^[10]). The $4B price tag for Nimbus’s drug at Phase 2 is a telling benchmark – it underscores how valuable a successful TYK2 inhibitor can be in the eyes of large pharma (^[10]). By comparison, as of early 2026, Alumis’ market capitalization likely remains well below that figure (even after the recent surge). This gap could imply upside if envudeucitinib’s profile is confirmed and especially if a partnering or acquisition offer emerges. In effect, the market may be undervaluing ALMS relative to the precedent set by Takeda/Nimbus. Of course, it’s not a perfect apples-to-apples comparison – Nimbus sold at a time when there were fewer late-stage TYK2 contenders and before any Phase 3 data. Now, with one approved drug (Sotyktu) and another pharma-sponsored contender (Takeda’s) in the mix, Alumis will have to differentiate itself to command a premium. That said, the Phase 3 data do differentiate envudeucitinib on efficacy, and if safety holds up, Alumis could either become a buyout target or go it alone and capture significant share.

– Peer Comparison: Among publicly traded peers, there are not many pure-play TYK2 companies – many were acquired or are still private. One comp could be Ventyx Biosciences, which is developing a next-gen TYK2 inhibitor for psoriasis; its market cap has fluctuated with its trial results. Also, consider Dermatology biotech peers with late-stage assets (for example, Arcutis Biotherapeutics for topical psoriasis, or smaller companies in immunology). However, Alumis’ broad pipeline (lupus, MS, TED) makes it somewhat unique. In lupus, it could eventually compete with drugs like anifrolumab (AstraZeneca’s approved IFN receptor blocker) or other oral immunology meds, but a highly effective oral option would be game-changing there as well. Overall, ALMS’s valuation will hinge on clinical success and commercialization prospects – at this moment, the successful Phase 3 de-risks the lead asset greatly, so many analysts would sum-of-parts value envudeucitinib (psoriasis + potential lupus use) plus A-005 and lonigutamab (which each have their own multi-hundred-million potential markets). With the stock’s recent jump, some of that value is being recognized, but the upside could continue if milestones are hit (or if a partnership infuses non-dilutive capital). Conversely, the valuation could be pressured if any setbacks occur or if the market perceives the competitive landscape will limit Alumis’ share.

In summary, Alumis appears attractively valued relative to its assets: It has a hefty cash buffer and a Phase 3-proven drug in a blockbuster indication, yet its enterprise value remains reasonable. Investors “not wanting to miss out” are banking on envudeucitinib replicating the success of first-generation therapies with even better results – if that happens, ALMS could see significant value creation from today’s levels.

Key Risks and Red Flags

While Alumis’ prospects are promising, there are material risks and red flags that investors should keep in mind:

– Regulatory and Clinical Risk: Despite excellent Phase 3 outcomes, envudeucitinib still needs regulatory approval. The FDA will scrutinize the safety data (particularly any less common adverse events and long-term use signals). Any unforeseen safety issue or manufacturing hurdle could delay or jeopardize approval. Furthermore, Alumis must complete its lupus trial – SLE is a very challenging indication, and success in psoriasis doesn’t guarantee success in lupus (different disease biology and patient population). A failure or weak result in lupus (expected Q3 2026) would undermine the “pipeline-in-a-pill” narrative and could hurt investor sentiment. Additionally, A-005 and lonigutamab are earlier in development; they carry typical clinical risk (Phase 2 trials may not reproduce Phase 1 findings, etc.). Lonigutamab, for instance, faces competition from an approved drug (Tepezza) in thyroid eye disease; if its efficacy is inferior or safety worse, its path to market could be complicated. Any clinical setback in these programs would remove potential future value and could sting the stock.

– Competitive Landscape: The psoriasis market is crowded and competitive. If approved around 2027, envudeucitinib will go up against BMS’s Sotyktu (already on the market) and possibly Takeda’s TAK-279 (which entered Phase 3 trials, meaning it could also be aiming for approval in a similar timeframe) (^[4]). Moreover, doctors have many biologic options (e.g. Humira biosimilars, IL-17 inhibitors, IL-23 inhibitors like Skyrizi, etc.) which have high efficacy. While an oral with biologic-like efficacy is compelling, market penetration will depend on differentiation and marketing. If envudeucitinib’s advantages over Sotyktu (or over biologics) are perceived as modest, uptake could be slower than bulls expect. Competitors could also respond – for example, BMS might develop next-gen TYK2 inhibitors or adjust Sotyktu dosing if feasible to improve outcomes (^[10]). In lupus, competition is also emerging (various biologics and orals in trials). A related risk is that payers (insurers) might restrict use of a premium-priced new oral if cheaper alternatives exist or if they demand more long-term safety data. Alumis will be entering markets dominated by much larger companies; commercial execution risk is significant, especially if Alumis tries to launch alone without a big pharma partner.

– Market and Execution Risk: Alumis has no experience as a commercial-stage company. If envudeucitinib gets approved, the company will face a strategic decision: partner/sell or commercialize in-house. Going alone means building a salesforce, marketing, and distribution capabilities, which is costly and complex. Missteps in launch strategy could impair the drug’s potential. On the other hand, if they partner or accept an acquisition, the terms may not fully reward current shareholders (depending on negotiation leverage). There’s also timeline risk: NDA submission is in H2 2026, so approval (if standard review) might not come until H2 2027. That’s a long wait with no guarantee of interim catalysts beyond the lupus data. The stock could be volatile or languish during this period, especially given macro market conditions for biotech funding. Dilution risk is lower in the near term due to the cash runway, but by 2027 the company might need more capital if it hasn’t secured a commercial partnership or if it decides to also push other programs through expensive Phase 3 trials.

– Integration and Focus: Alumis’ merger with ACELYRIN brought substantial benefits (cash and pipeline assets), but also potential integration challenges. Merging two organizations can cause distraction and increased overhead. Notably, ACELYRIN’s original flagship program (izokibep, a biologic for inflammatory diseases) appears to have been deprioritized or left out of the combined pipeline focus – likely due to less competitive data. ACELYRIN pursued izokibep in conditions like hidradenitis suppurativa, but this program had setbacks that led to the strategic pivot and merger. The fact that the combined company dropped mention of that asset is a minor red flag – it suggests a prior focal program did not pan out as hoped. While Alumis wisely refocused on the strongest assets (envu, A-005, lonigutamab), it’s a reminder that even promising drugs can disappoint. There may also be cultural differences or overlap in roles post-merger; morale or productivity could be affected if not managed well. So far, management touts a smooth combination and “disciplined” operations post-merger (^[5]), but this is something to watch.

– No Revenue / High Dependence on Single Asset: Until alumis can commercialize a product (or out-license one), it will generate essentially no revenue. That means an ongoing net loss position and dependence on external capital. The prolonged period until potential sales begin is a risk in itself – unforeseen needs or macroeconomic shifts could impact financing or operations. Moreover, envudeucitinib is clearly the key value driver in the near term; the company’s fate is heavily tied to this one asset. If any issues arise with envu (regulatory, safety, competitive, etc.), Alumis currently does not have an approved product to fall back on. While the pipeline has breadth, those other programs (A-005, lonigutamab) are a bit further from market. This concentration risk means the stock could swing dramatically on any news specific to envudeucitinib.

In essence, Alumis faces the classic biotech risks: clinical/regulatory uncertainties, commercial and competitive battles ahead, and the need to eventually transition from an R&D outfit to a product company. Investors should be aware that while the upside is significant (if Alumis’ drugs achieve their potential, the stock could multiply), the downside of failures or delays is also substantial (the stock could retrace gains or worse). Careful attention to trial readouts, FDA communications, and competitor developments is warranted going forward.

Conclusion and Open Questions

Alumis (ALMS) presents a compelling story: a well-funded biotech with a breakthrough-caliber oral drug for psoriasis that just demonstrated efficacy on par with the best therapies available. The recent major promise shown in skin drug trials positions envudeucitinib as potentially the next big thing in immunology, and investors don’t want to miss the opportunity if this indeed becomes a high-demand treatment. The company’s strategic merger fortified its balance sheet and expanded its pipeline, giving it multiple shots at success in large markets (psoriasis, lupus, MS, thyroid eye disease) (^[9]). By all accounts, Alumis is entering 2026 with strong momentum: pivotal data in hand, more milestones on the horizon, and cash to get there (^[3]).

However, it’s not a risk-free ride, and some open questions remain:

– Will Alumis partner or go solo for commercialization? The “go-to-market” strategy is undecided publicly. Partnering with a big pharma for psoriasis could accelerate uptake (leveraging an established sales force in dermatology) and provide upfront cash. On the other hand, retaining rights and launching alone could yield greater long-term profit if executed well. Management’s choice here will significantly impact the company’s capital needs and profit potential. This is an open question likely to be answered as the NDA filing approaches – or sooner if suitors emerge attracted by envudeucitinib’s data.

– How will envudeucitinib stack up against competition in real-world use? While the Phase 3 trials were a clear win, real-world patient populations and longer-term use could present new challenges. Sotyktu is entrenched as first-to-market; can Alumis convince prescribers and payers that envu is meaningfully better? Head-to-head data is lacking (envu wasn’t directly compared to Sotyktu in trials), so some in the market may wait to see post-approval usage or indirect comparisons. Moreover, Takeda’s TAK-279 might have its own strong data soon. The competitive dynamics – who gains first-mover advantage, pricing strategy, etc. – will shape the ultimate market share envudeucitinib can capture. Investors will be watching upcoming conference presentations and any competitor trial results to gauge this.

– Can Alumis execute on its broader pipeline concurrently? With envu moving toward regulatory filing, Alumis will be running a Phase 2 in lupus (readout Q3 2026) and starting a Phase 2 in MS (A-005 in H1 2026). Possibly, a Phase 3 for lonigutamab in TED could also initiate in 2025/26. That’s a lot of balls in the air. Does the company have the bandwidth and expertise to manage multiple trials and programs effectively? The answer may depend on whether they prioritize or sequence these projects. A related question: will some of these programs be partnered out to lighten the load? For example, a partnership on A-005 for MS could bring in specialized neurology expertise. How Alumis allocates its resources across this expanded pipeline will be a key factor in its long-term success.

– What is the long-term value of Alumis? If envudeucitinib gets approved and captures a meaningful share in psoriasis (and potentially lupus), how large can sales get? Psoriasis is a multi-billion market, but with competition, a new oral might carve out perhaps a few billion in peak sales if highly successful. Lupus, MS, and TED represent additional upside beyond that. Some analysts might already speculate that Alumis could be a takeover candidate – big pharma always seeks strong immunology assets, and ALMS has de-risked one. Will shareholders see a buyout offer in 2026? Or will Alumis remain independent and aim to become a mid-size immunology company? These open-ended possibilities make it both exciting and uncertain. The valuation discussion earlier implies that there could be considerable upside if things go right, but realizing that value depends on strategic choices and flawless execution in the next couple of years.

In conclusion, Alumis has transformed from an R&D-stage hopeful into a late-stage contender with a validated drug candidate that might change the standard of care in psoriasis. The phrase “Don’t Miss Out” reflects the bullish view that now is a critical juncture – the company has major promise on display, and if it continues to hit milestones, the stock could further re-rate upward. Still, prospective investors should weigh the risks discussed and monitor how outstanding questions get resolved. Is ALMS the next big dermatology/immunology winner? The pieces are in place for success: a talented management (led by industry veteran CEO Martin Babler), strong science, ample cash, and clear unmet needs in its target diseases. The coming 12-18 months – with regulatory steps and more trial readouts – will be crucial in determining if Alumis fully delivers on its potential. For now, the data are highly encouraging (^[2]), and Alumis is a biotech story on the rise – one that savvy investors will not want to ignore.

Sources

1. https://investors.alumis.com/
2. https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/01/06/3213465/0/en/Alumis-Envudeucitinib-Delivers-Leading-Skin-Clearance-Among-Next-Generation-Oral-Plaque-Psoriasis-Therapies-in-Phase-3-Program.html
3. https://alumis.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/alumis-reports-second-quarter-2025-financial-results-and
4. https://medcitynews.com/2024/06/alumis-ipo-inflammation-immunology-plaque-psoriasis-tyk2-alms/
5. https://investors.alumis.com/news-releases/news-release-details/alumis-completes-merger-acelyrin
6. https://westlakebio.com/acelyrin-inc-announces-positive-phase-1-2-proof-of-concept-data-for-lonigutamab-first-subcutaneous-anti-igf-1r-to-demonstrate-clinical-responses-in-thyroid-eye-disease/
7. https://ophthalmologytimes.com/view/acelyrin-unveils-phase-3-program-design-for-lonigutamab-in-thyroid-eye-disease
8. https://biospace.com/press-releases/acelyrin-inc-announces-additional-phase-2-data-and-phase-3-program-design-for-lonigutamab-in-thyroid-eye-disease
9. https://biospace.com/press-releases/acelyrin-and-alumis-reaffirm-strategic-and-financial-rationale-of-proposed-merger
10. https://biospace.com/alumis-files-for-ipo-to-fund-phase-iii-trials-of-potential-rival-drug-to-bms-sotyktu
11. https://biospace.com/press-releases/alumis-envudeucitinib-delivers-leading-skin-clearance-among-next-generation-oral-plaque-psoriasis-therapies-in-phase-3-program
12. https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1847367/000155837024012081/tmb-20240630x10q.htm
13. https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/08/13/3132978/0/en/Alumis-Reports-Second-Quarter-2025-Financial-Results-and-Provides-Corporate-Update.html

For informational purposes only; not investment advice.