GOSS: Class Action Alert – Are You Affected? Contact Now!

Company Background

Gossamer Bio was founded in 2015 and went public in February 2019 (ir.gossamerbio.com). The company’s strategy has centered on developing seralutinib, an inhaled therapy for pulmonary hypertension (including PAH and PH-ILD) (fintel.io). In May 2024, Gossamer struck a high-profile collaboration with Italy’s Chiesi Farmaceutici, securing an upfront $160 million payment to support seralutinib’s Phase 3 programs (www.chiesi.com). In return, Chiesi obtained ex-US commercialization rights and profit-sharing in the U.S., with Gossamer eligible for up to $326 million in future regulatory and sales milestones (www.chiesi.com). This partnership – touted as “transformative” – reflected optimism about seralutinib’s prospects (www.chiesi.com).

However, Gossamer’s fortunes took a sharp turn in early 2026 when the pivotal PAH trial (PROSERA) failed to show a statistically significant benefit on the primary endpoint (6-minute walk distance at 24 weeks) (www.morningstar.com). Management attributed the miss to “an outsize placebo response and meaningful regional heterogeneity,” noting that patients in Latin America (a region they had targeted for enrollment) showed especially strong improvements on placebo, which diluted the drug-placebo difference (www.morningstar.com) (www.morningstar.com). The stock collapse that ensued wiped out a substantial portion of Gossamer’s market value (www.morningstar.com) and left the company with a single main asset in jeopardy. The class action lawsuit now being pursued focuses on whether Gossamer failed to disclose trial design issues – such as its patient recruitment strategy and site monitoring – that could predict this outcome (www.morningstar.com) (www.morningstar.com). In essence, investors are alleging they were overly assured about the trial when, internally, significant risks were known.

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Dividend Policy & Shareholder Returns

Like many development-stage biotech companies, Gossamer does not pay any dividends. The company has never declared or paid a cash dividend on its common stock, and it currently offers no dividend reinvestment plan (gossamerbio.gcs-web.com). Management’s focus is on reinvesting capital into R&D and clinical trials rather than returning cash to shareholders. As a result, GOSS’s dividend yield is 0%, and investors have been relying solely on potential stock price appreciation (or depreciation, as recent events showed) for returns. There is no indication this policy will change given the company’s ongoing losses and need to conserve cash.

Leverage and Debt Maturities

Despite having no product revenues, Gossamer carries a significant amount of debt on its balance sheet. In May 2020, the company issued $200 million in aggregate principal of 5.00% Convertible Senior Notes due 2027 (fintel.io). These notes pay a fixed 5% coupon (approximately $10 million in interest expense per year) and will mature on June 1, 2027, unless converted or repurchased earlier (fintel.io). The conversion price is about $16.23 per share (61.6095 shares per $1,000 of principal) (fintel.io) – a level that is now far out of reach with GOSS trading well below $1. In practical terms, this debt behaves like straight unsecured debt, since conversion to equity is unlikely unless the stock miraculously rebounds over 3,500% to above $16.

Importantly, Gossamer still owes most of this $200 million principal. The company has made some efforts to repurchase and retire a portion of the notes in the open market – taking advantage of their discounted trading prices in recent years. Cash flow statements show principal debt repayments of $5.8 million in 2022, $11.6 million in 2023, and $12.6 million in 2024 (fintel.io). These piecemeal buybacks total roughly $30 million, suggesting that roughly $170 million of the notes remain outstanding. Even after these reductions, the debt load is substantial relative to the company’s resources. Gossamer’s 2024 annual report acknowledged the burden, noting that it had issued $200 million of such notes and held other liabilities of ~$88 million, which could “limit the cash flow available for operations” and pose significant risks to its financial condition (fintel.io). The remaining notes will come due in less than one year after the current cash runway ends, creating a hard deadline for the company to find a solution (refinancing, restructuring or repayment) in the absence of a turnaround.

Beyond the convertibles, Gossamer’s liabilities also include deferred revenue from the Chiesi partnership. As of year-end 2024, the company recorded about $55.9 million in contract liabilities related to the collaboration (split between current and long-term) (fintel.io). This represents the portion of Chiesi’s $160 million upfront that Gossamer had not yet “earned” (by conducting R&D or hitting milestones) and would recognize as revenue over time. Unlike debt, this deferred revenue doesn’t require cash repayment; rather, it reflects obligations to spend on development. However, with the future of seralutinib now uncertain, it’s unclear how much of this will ever convert to earned revenue – an unsettled issue if the collaboration terms are revisited. Gossamer does not appear to have other major forms of debt like bank loans or capital leases of significance. The 5% 2027 notes are the core leverage, and they currently rank senior to any equity in claims on the company’s assets (fintel.io).

Maturity Profile: With the convertible notes maturing in mid-2027, Gossamer theoretically had time to either succeed in its trials or refinance. But the clock is ticking faster after the trial failure. The noteholders have a standard put option in the event of certain defaults or fundamental changes, but most immediately, if Gossamer’s financial position keeps deteriorating, honoring the 2027 maturity (or even continuing the hefty interest payments) could be challenging. Notably, as of December 31, 2024, the fair value of the remaining notes was estimated at only $110 million (vs. $200M face) (fintel.io), reflecting investor skepticism – even before the Phase 3 fiasco – about the company’s ability to fully repay. Now, with the stock in penny-stock territory and the drug’s prospects dim, the debt overhang is a critical issue for both shareholders and creditors. Any debt restructuring (if it comes to that) could significantly dilute equity or leave equity with little to no value, a risk that shareholders must keep in mind.

Financial Position and Coverage

Gossamer’s liquidity and cash burn are central to evaluating its viability. At December 31, 2025, the company reported $136.9 million in cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities (intrado.kscope.io). This was a steep drop from $294.5 million a year prior (intrado.kscope.io), reflecting the cash-intensive nature of running multiple Phase 3 trials. Indeed, full-year 2025 R&D expenses were $174.1 million, up from $138.5 million in 2024 (intrado.kscope.io), contributing to a net loss of $170.4 million for 2025 (intrado.kscope.io). Gossamer’s own guidance (prior to the trial result) was that its year-end 2025 cash was sufficient to fund operations into the first quarter of 2027 (intrado.kscope.io). This guidance assumed continuing development activities; it will likely be adjusted as the company cuts spending. In February 2026, management implemented a workforce reduction to align resources with new priorities (intrado.kscope.io) – a clear move to conserve cash in light of the trial disappointment. Such cost-cutting could extend the runway somewhat, but the fact remains that cash burn has been very high relative to remaining cash.

When it comes to coverage ratios, Gossamer’s financials leave much to be desired. The company has no earnings and chronically negative operating cash flow, so traditional interest coverage (EBITDA/Interest) is deeply negative. In 2025, Gossamer likely paid on the order of $10–12 million in cash interest (2019–2024 interest payments were in this range, e.g. $10.6M in 2024) (fintel.io). With zero revenues and a net loss of $170M (intrado.kscope.io), it’s clear that interest obligations are being met out of cash reserves, not earnings. Even during 2024, which saw a temporarily smaller net loss due to the Chiesi upfront payment, the company still consumed significant cash in operations.

By the end of 2025, Gossamer’s balance sheet had flipped to a shareholders’ deficit: total liabilities of $295.0 million outweighed total assets of $172.2 million (intrado.kscope.io). Accumulated losses have exceeded $1.43 billion (intrado.kscope.io). This means the company’s book value is negative, an indicator of financial stress. Gossamer is essentially insolvent on a balance-sheet basis (although as a going concern it continues to operate with its cash cushion). In practical terms, unless new value is created (through successful R&D or asset sales) or new capital injected, creditors will have the senior claim on any remaining assets. The convertible notes, while unsecured, effectively sit ahead of equity in a downside scenario – a fact not lost on the market.

The company’s auditors and management have not yet (publicly) issued a going concern warning, given the cash on hand. But looking ahead, by 2027 or sooner Gossamer will need to either find new funding, strike a rescue deal, or dramatically cut costs to meet its obligations. The current cash should carry it through 2026 under a pared-back budget, but the looming debt maturity and the need to fund any further trials (if they even pursue them) are huge question marks. In summary, financial coverage is very thin – Gossamer’s operations are entirely funded by external capital (equity raises, partner funds, and debt), with no self-sustaining revenues in sight. This precarious position heightens the risk for stakeholders, especially if avenues for refinancing or raising additional capital dry up in the wake of the failed trial.

Valuation and Comparables

After the recent collapse in share price, Gossamer’s market valuation has compressed significantly. The stock trades around $0.40–$0.50 per share (as of early May 2026), down from 52-week highs near $3.87 and a pre-PROSERA price of ~$2 (investorshub.advfn.com). With roughly 230–240 million shares outstanding (the count as of March 2025 was 227.2M and may be higher now due to at-the-market issuances, warrant exercises, etc.) (fintel.io) (fintel.io), GOSS’s market capitalization is on the order of $100 million. This is a tiny fraction of what it was at its peak and even below the cash it had six months ago – an indication that investors are heavily discounting the company’s future prospects (and perhaps pricing in the debt overhang).

Traditional valuation multiples are not very applicable for Gossamer: it has no positive earnings, no positive EBITDA, and negative book equity. Metrics like P/E or EV/EBITDA are not meaningful in this context (the company’s “E” is a large loss). Even price-to-book cannot be used since book value per share is negative post-2025 (intrado.kscope.io). Analysts and investors instead value a company like this based on enterprise value relative to assets (primarily cash and any pipeline value).

One way to look at it is Enterprise Value (EV): Gossamer’s EV ≈ Market Cap + Debt – Cash. Using rough figures: $100M equity + ~$170M debt – ~$137M cash = ~$133M EV. In essence, the market is saying that the company as a whole is worth about $130 million. Notably, that is less than the face value of the debt alone. It implies that equity holders are deeply subordinated – if you subtract the debt, the implied value left for equity would be negative, reflecting the reality of the balance sheet. However, in biotech, EV includes the pipeline’s speculative value. Right now, investors appear to assign only a very modest value to seralutinib or any other assets beyond cash. The EV of $133M is just slightly below the deferred Chiesi funds plus cash on hand, suggesting that the pipeline is viewed as impaired and possibly even a liability (given it will consume cash).

For context, prior to the trial result, GOSS stock price already reflected skepticism but did carry hope value. At ~$2/share with ~230M shares, market cap was ~$460M. Subtracting, say, ~$200M net cash at mid-2025, the pipeline was valued around $260M. That has now imploded. Comparable companies in biotech that suffer a Phase 3 failure often trade near or below cash value unless they have other programs. Gossamer is now in that camp – “trading below cash” by market cap, a classic sign of distress (though, again, one must consider the debt; on an EV basis it’s not really below cash).

From a fundamental valuation perspective, any optimism would hinge on whether seralutinib can still be salvaged or repurposed (for instance, in PH-ILD or combination therapy). If not, the remaining value is mostly the diminishing cash, which will be eaten up by winding down or litigating unless a strategic deal is made. One could also consider Merck’s sotatercept (a competitor therapy for PAH): Merck acquired its developer (Acceleron) for ~$11 billion, highlighting how valuable an effective PAH drug can be (www.morningstar.com). Gossamer’s seralutinib was once billed as a potential first-in-class PAH therapy in its own right (www.morningstar.com), but after failing to meet endpoints, its value has plummeted to highly speculative. The market is effectively saying there is only a slim chance of extracting meaningful value from Gossamer’s assets at this point.

In summary, GOSS shares are now essentially an option on some positive surprise – be it a reversal of fortune in data analysis, a takeout offer, or another pipeline asset coming to light. Otherwise, the valuation reflects a company whose tangible value might mostly accrue to creditors. Investors who bought in the class period (June 16, 2025–Feb 20, 2026) at much higher prices have seen their investment’s value virtually destroyed (www.morningstar.com) (www.morningstar.com). This underpins the urgency behind the class action: it’s an attempt to recoup some of those losses via legal means, given the investment case has fundamentally deteriorated.

Risks and Red Flags

Gossamer Bio faces a confluence of major risks and red flags that investors – especially those considering joining the class action – should be aware of:

– Pipeline/Clinical Risk: The failure of the Phase 3 PROSERA trial is an existential risk for Gossamer (www.morningstar.com). Seralutinib was the company’s lead (and essentially only) advanced asset. With PAH results failing to show significance, the entire premise of the company’s pipeline is in doubt. Management paused a second Phase 3 trial (SERANATA in PH-ILD) pending analysis (intrado.kscope.io), reflecting uncertainty about whether the drug works in any indication. There is a serious risk that seralutinib’s efficacy is insufficient or too hard to prove, meaning years of R&D and investment could yield nothing approvable. In biotech, a major late-stage failure often leaves a company with little to fall back on – that is precisely Gossamer’s predicament now.

– Regulatory & Competitive Risk: Even if Gossamer tries to salvage seralutinib with post-hoc analyses or a new trial, regulatory hurdles will be high. The FDA will likely require additional robust evidence after a failed Phase 3. This means costly new trials or endpoints that Gossamer may not have resources for. Additionally, competition in PAH has intensified. Merck’s sotatercept (now approved as Altuviiio for PAH) showed very strong results, raising the bar for any new therapy (www.morningstar.com). If a big pharma like Merck dominates the PAH space, seralutinib – even if marginally effective – could struggle to find a market unless it has a unique niche (perhaps in PH-ILD or in combination). This competitive dynamic makes Gossamer’s path to commercial success even more challenging, a red flag for its valuation.

– Financial & Solvency Risk: Gossamer’s financial health is poor and worsening. The company is burning tens of millions of dollars per quarter with no revenue. It now has negative shareholder equity (intrado.kscope.io), meaning liabilities exceed assets. Its cash runway (into Q1 2027) (intrado.kscope.io) is predicated on cutting back activities – any attempt to run new trials could accelerate cash depletion. Crucially, the $200M convertible debt due 2027 looms large (fintel.io). If Gossamer cannot significantly raise its stock price or refinance, it may default or have to restructure this debt, potentially wiping out equity. The risk of bankruptcy or forced asset sales is real if no positive developments occur before the money runs out. This financial fragility is a glaring red flag for investors and one reason the stock is trading at distressed levels.

– Litigation & Governance Risk: The recent securities class action allegations add another layer of risk. Law firms like Hagens Berman and Levi & Korsinsky claim Gossamer misled investors about the PROSERA trial – specifically by downplaying known trial design issues and over-promising on outcomes (www.morningstar.com). For example, management highlighted how they enrolled patients in regions expected to show great efficacy, without disclosing that those choices might backfire with high placebo responses (www.morningstar.com) (www.morningstar.com). If these allegations have merit, it suggests possible governance issues or at least poor judgment by executives in communications. The class action (covering investors who bought between Jun 16, 2025 and Feb 20, 2026) is still in early stages with a lead plaintiff deadline of June 1, 2026 (www.morningstar.com). While such lawsuits often settle for insurance money, they can distract management, hurt the company’s reputation, and in some cases reveal uncomfortable facts. Gossamer already settled a prior shareholder lawsuit in 2022 for ~$2.4 million (zlk.com), which was related to earlier drug setbacks. The recurrence of investor litigation is a red flag in itself, pointing to a pattern of over-optimistic claims followed by disappointments.

– Stock Price and Listing Risk: GOSS stock currently trades well below $1.00, which puts the company at risk of Nasdaq delisting if the price doesn’t recover above the minimum bid price threshold. Typically, companies in this situation either get a grace period to cure the deficiency or execute a reverse stock split to boost the share price. A delisting would severely impair liquidity for the stock and could force institutional investors out. Even a reverse split, while keeping the listing, often leads to further selling pressure. This technical risk is on the horizon for Gossamer and underscores the precariousness of its equity.

– Partnership/Contract Risk: The Chiesi partnership, once a vote of confidence, is now on uncertain ground. Chiesi’s $160M infusion was meant to accelerate seralutinib’s development (www.chiesi.com). With PAH results disappointing, Chiesi may be re-evaluating its commitment. There could be clauses that allow Chiesi to terminate or modify the agreement under certain conditions (these details aren’t public yet). If Chiesi pulls back, Gossamer would lose not only potential milestone payments but also a partner with deep respiratory expertise. Even if the collaboration isn’t formally terminated, in practical terms it may not progress – for instance, the planned Phase 3 in PH-ILD (which Chiesi was to help fund) is now on hold (intrado.kscope.io). The risk is that Gossamer ends up with no active partner and possibly have to return unspent funds or at least proceed solo, which it likely cannot afford.

In sum, Gossamer exhibits nearly every red flag one can imagine for a biotech: a crucial trial failure, cash burn with limited runway, heavy debt, shareholder lawsuits, and the specter of delisting. Current and prospective investors should weigh these risks heavily. The situation could deteriorate further if, for example, the class action uncovers damaging information, or if creditors start to get restive. Conversely, the only real mitigant would be some unexpected good news (e.g., a surprising regulatory compromise or a new investor stepping in), which at this point would be a pleasant surprise against a backdrop of red flags.

Open Questions for Investors

Given the turbulent state of affairs, there are several open questions that will determine Gossamer Bio’s future – and by extension, the outcome for investors and class members:

– Can seralutinib be salvaged or repurposed? Gossamer’s management says it is “evaluating the totality of the dataset, engaging with the FDA, and assessing strategic options” after the PROSERA Phase 3 failure (intrado.kscope.io). Investors are left wondering if any subset of patients or secondary endpoints (e.g., the NT-proBNP biomarker improvements noted in the data (intrado.kscope.io)) could support a path forward. Will the FDA entertain a narrower approval or a smaller confirmatory trial if, say, certain patient subgroups benefited? Or is a whole new trial required (which the company likely cannot fund right now)? Also, what about the PH-ILD indication – is there enough rationale to resume that trial in the absence of a PAH win? The answers will determine if seralutinib retains any value or if it’s essentially a dead asset.

– What “strategic options” might be pursued? This phrase often implies exploring mergers, acquisitions, or asset sales. One question is whether Gossamer will put itself up for sale. Given its depressed market cap (~$100M) and remaining cash, a larger pharma or specialty player could consider acquiring Gossamer primarily for the cash on hand and the Chiesi-aligned PH-ILD program (if they believe there’s salvageable science). Alternatively, Gossamer might try to sell the seralutinib program outright to a company better positioned to run another trial. Another option is restructuring – negotiating with noteholders to swap debt for equity at some ratio, to alleviate the debt load (though current equity holders would get diluted even more). Or, in a harsher scenario, the company might wind down operations, returning any residual cash to creditors and perhaps nothing to equity. Clarity on these strategic paths (sale, partnership, independent continuation, or liquidation) is highly anticipated by all stakeholders.

– How will the convertible note situation be resolved? With ~$170M of the 2027 notes still outstanding, this is a ticking time bomb. If Gossamer cannot raise substantial new capital or revive its stock price, it’s hard to see it fully paying off the notes by 2027. Will the noteholders push for an earlier debt restructuring or settlement? They might fear that if Gossamer waits until the last minute, there will be little cash left. A possible outcome is negotiating a haircut or conversion – for example, exchanging debt for equity at a steep discount. However, at today’s stock price, issuing even a billion new shares wouldn’t cover $170M, so this is complex. Bankruptcy protection (Chapter 11) is another route to handle the debt if negotiations fail; that would likely wipe out existing equity. Investors should watch for any signs of the company hiring debt advisors or trying to buy back more notes on the market – those could signal moves to address this question.

– What will happen with the class action, and are you eligible? For shareholders who bought GOSS during the Class Period (June 16, 2025 through Feb 20, 2026), the lawsuit outcome is an important consideration. The court filings (e.g., the complaint filed March 31, 2026) allege that Gossamer’s executives knew or recklessly disregarded issues in trial recruitment and “crafted a narrative” that the study would succeed (www.morningstar.com), despite internal red flags. If you purchased shares in that window and suffered substantial losses, you may have the right to seek lead plaintiff status or otherwise participate in any recovery. The lead plaintiff deadline is June 1, 2026 (www.morningstar.com), so affected investors should decide soon whether to be actively involved. A key open question is what kind of recovery (if any) might investors see from this litigation. Gossamer’s available D&O insurance and remaining assets will cap any settlement. Given a past settlement was around $2.4M (zlk.com), one might not expect a windfall. But if the allegations are serious, the suit could deter future misstatements and at least offer some compensation. Bottom line: If you are in that class of investors, it’s worth consulting with the law firms or your counsel – your rights could expire if you do nothing.

– Will Nasdaq compliance become an issue? At current prices under $1, GOSS will likely receive a deficiency notice from Nasdaq. Management will then have to either get the stock price back above $1 (unlikely through organic market moves in the short term) or execute a reverse stock split (for example, 1-for-10 or more) to artificially raise the price. An open question is when and how they handle this. A reverse split could happen in the coming months if the price stays depressed. While this is largely cosmetic (10 shares at $0.40 becoming 1 share at $4.00, for instance), it can affect market perception and trading dynamics. Investors should be prepared for this procedural step, as it often accompanies companies in distress.

– Is there any hidden or undervalued asset in Gossamer? This is more speculative, but sometimes small biotechs have earlier-stage compounds or technology that, while not in the spotlight, could be spun off or monetized. Gossamer had earlier programs (for example, GB004 for ulcerative colitis and GB1275 in immunology) that were deprioritized. Are these completely dead, or could they be sold/licensed to bring in some cash? Additionally, Gossamer’s accumulated net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards could be valuable to an acquirer looking for tax assets – though a change of control could limit their usage. It’s an open question whether any such fringe asset could provide a lifeline or additional value that the market is not currently pricing in.

Each of these open questions will likely see developments in the coming weeks and months. For investors who feel “affected” by what’s transpired, staying informed is crucial. If you’re considering joining the class action, monitor the legal filings and be mindful of deadlines. If you’re holding the stock or bonds, watch for any strategic updates from the company (perhaps at the next quarterly report or a special update on strategy). The situation is fluid: new trial data cuts, partnership news from Chiesi, or creditor actions could alter Gossamer’s trajectory. Unfortunately, most of these questions underscore the uncertainty and downside risk surrounding GOSS at this juncture, with few clear catalysts for recovery.

Conclusion

Gossamer Bio (GOSS) finds itself at a crossroads fraught with peril. The company’s zero-revenue, all-or-nothing business model has hit a major setback with the failure of its pivotal PAH trial, sending its stock into a tailspin (www.morningstar.com). Gossamer offers no income to investors (no dividends) (gossamerbio.gcs-web.com), a weakening balance sheet, and heavy obligations – a $200M convertible debt that it may struggle to repay (fintel.io) – all against the backdrop of burning cash to fund research that now looks increasingly speculative. The valuation collapse reflects these grim realities, with the market essentially pricing in distress and minimal confidence in a turnaround.

For shareholders who bought into the company’s earlier optimism – perhaps drawn by management’s bullish statements about seralutinib’s multi-billion dollar potential (www.morningstar.com) – the outcome has been destructive. It is precisely these investors that the emerging class action lawsuit aims to represent. The suit alleges that Gossamer painted an unjustifiably rosy picture of its trial prospects while concealing critical design flaws (www.morningstar.com). Whether or not these claims hold up in court, this development is a clear signal that investors feel misled and seek accountability. If you invested in GOSS between June 16, 2025 and Feb 20, 2026 and suffered losses, you may be affected by this class action and should evaluate your legal options. According to Hagens Berman, the lead plaintiff motion deadline is June 1, 2026, and they encourage affected shareholders to contact them or the court to participate (www.morningstar.com). (You can typically reach out via the firm’s contact info provided in their notices – for instance, by emailing or calling the contacts listed in the press release (www.morningstar.com) – or by visiting the class action website to submit your information.)

Looking ahead, Gossamer’s story will likely be one of drastic change: either a last-ditch effort to salvage value or a gradual unwinding. Management’s credibility is under question, cash is finite, and the science has yet to deliver on its promise. Current shareholders must brace for potentially dilutive or value-destructive maneuvers (such as debt restructuring or asset fire-sales) as the company tries to stay afloat. New investors, on the other hand, might view GOSS as a high-risk lottery ticket – essentially betting that perhaps something can be saved (for example, a pivot to PH-ILD or a buyout at a premium to the current rock-bottom price).

In any scenario, prudent due diligence and caution are warranted. Gossamer Bio’s situation highlights the volatile nature of biotech investing, where blockbuster hopes can turn into near-bust overnight. If you believe you have been financially harmed by the events described – for example, by relying on Gossamer’s management statements that now appear questionable – the Class Action Alert is a prompt to take action and assert your rights. At the same time, keep an eye on corporate developments: a company in this much trouble can undergo rapid changes (leadership shake-ups, strategic shifts, etc.).

In conclusion, GOSS investors are facing a perfect storm: scientific risk, financial risk, and legal risk have all converged. Whether you choose to hold, sell, join the lawsuit, or avoid the stock entirely, make sure those decisions are informed by the facts and grounded in a sober assessment of the company’s position. This report has provided those facts with source-backed analysis – from the absence of any dividend cushion (gossamerbio.gcs-web.com), to the mounting debt due in 2027 (fintel.io), to the sobering trial failure that triggered an 80% crash (www.morningstar.com). Armed with this information, affected investors should carefully consider their next steps. And if you believe you are indeed “affected” as per the class period, contacting the relevant shareholder rights attorneys or the court by the deadline would be a timely move to preserve any claim you might have.

(This report is for informational purposes and reflects the situation as of early May 2026. Investors should consult the latest SEC filings and official class action notices for the most current information.)

For informational purposes only; not investment advice.